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Abstract 
This article examines late seventeenth century news management through the lens of the 
Haarlem journalist, Abraham Casteleyn. Its aim is to challenge the idea that ‘foreign’ news 
was of minor importance in Restoration England, by examining how contemporaries 
responded to titles like the Haarlem Courant, and to show that Dutch news was integral to 
domestic politics. It examines the demand for Dutch news by English readers, Whig activists 
and government officials; explores the ways in which Casteleyn’s newspaper caused concern 
within the regime because of its potential to be exploited for nefarious political ends; and 
explores how the Stuart regime responded by devising subtle methods for managing Dutch 
news. 
 
Questions about how people in the early modern period ‘managed’ information have garnered 
considerable attention in recent years. Scholars have dealt with individuals – scholarly and 
otherwise – who devised reading and note-taking practices for coping with information 
overload, as well as with issues relating to the burgeoning news industry.1 This has meant 
thinking about how contemporaries responded to the ‘news revolution’, although more 
commonly it has involved assessing government news management, albeit here analysis has 
generally focused somewhat narrowly on censorship and propaganda, in terms of the 
regulation of the news industry and the emergence of newspapers that were more or less 
obviously run by governments.2 Moreover, such news management has tended to involve 
concentrating on domestic news and domestic contexts, and the significance of news from 
beyond Britain’s shores remains poorly understood. Indeed, while it cannot be denied that 
more attention is gradually being paid to the European dimension of news culture, and to the 
transnational characteristics of news networks, this has yet to make a significant impact on 
our understanding of news management. Indeed, to the extent that international news 
management has been studied – at least by historians of English newspapers – attention has 
focused on efforts to influence flows of information from England to the Continent, in terms 
of attempts to export titles like Mercurius Politicus, to devise foreign language newspapers 
like Nouvelles Ordinaires de Londres, and to translate official journals like the London 
Gazette.3 Much less attention has been paid to where exactly the European news that 
appeared in English newspapers came from, what contemporaries made of it, and what 
political issues arose. For too long, indeed, it was assumed that European news was a poor 
substitute for English news, and that it tended to appear when domestic news was limited and 
proscribed, and arguments continue to be made that English readers were likely to have 
struggled to make sense of the European news that appeared in English newspapers and 
gazettes. Far too little has been done to investigate the mechanisms, practices and personnel 
involved in getting European news into English gazettes, despite the now well-established 
links that existed between secretaries of state and official newspapers, and despite the well-
known claim made by the republican intelligencer, Thomas Scott, that much of the 
intelligence he acquired was used to fill the official gazette.4 
This paper aims to help rectify this situation, not least by focusing on the relationship 
between Dutch news and English public life, and on relations between the English 
government of Charles II and the period’s pre-eminent Dutch journalist, Abraham Casteleyn. 
The second half of the seventeenth century witnessed the emergence of what has been 
described as an Anglo-Dutch public sphere, contributors to which commented upon and 
intervened in affairs in both countries, not least through the medium of printed texts that were 
capable of traversing borders, and the reign of Charles II was of particular importance for the 
history of Anglo-Dutch relations, witnessing as it did both the second and third Anglo-Dutch 
wars (1665-7 and 1672-4), which occurred in the context of a secretive treaty between the 
king and Louis XIV of France, and in a situation where many English Whigs lived in exile in 
and sought support from Dutch sympathisers, and where Dutch politicians were willing to 
conspire with them to meddle in English political affairs. This was emphatically a period 
when European affairs impinged upon domestic politics, and it was one which witnessed 
popular sentiment taking a decidedly anti-French turn, and growing support for the Dutch, 
particular once the Prince of Orange and his party returned to power.5  
In exploring the significance of Casteleyn’s journalism for a history of European news 
culture in the late seventeenth century, of course, this article cannot profess to be systematic, 
but rather is intended to highlight specific aspects of contemporary political life. It would be 
possible, therefore, to use Casteleyn to examine how Restoration regimes influenced what 
appeared in Dutch newspapers, but the aim here will instead be to build upon what is already 
known about Casteleyn’s connections to English political figures, and about his role in 
supplying news to England, including to secretaries of state like Sir Joseph Williamson. The 
aim, indeed, is to use Casteleyn as a means of deepening our understanding of the issues 
relating to news management in the late seventeenth century. Thus, while for this post-1660 
period we know something more about practices of news management than we do for earlier 
decades, in terms of stories being fed to the London Gazette, it remains true that this has not 
been explored very thoroughly, and certainly not in relation to continental news of the kind 
that Casteleyn supplied. Moreover, while we are also aware of the problems of news 
management, in terms of the dangers caused by inadequate intelligence, much more needs to 
be known about the problems which arose from the practices involved in feeding news to the 
Gazette.6 
 
I 
 Abraham Casteleyn began his journalistic career sometime before 1656, the year in which he 
established the Weeckelycke Courant van Europa. He claimed to have been motivated by ‘the 
falseness of the corantos which nowadays inform us of the movements of this troubled 
world’, and he regarded himself as the heir to Jan van Hilten, the most significant Dutch 
journalist of the preceding age, for whom he had sometimes supplied the intelligence which 
‘made his corantos better than those of the others’. By the early 1660s, Casteleyn’s paper had 
been renamed as the Oprechte Haerlemse Courant (or the Haarlem Courant) which appeared 
thrice weekly until his death in 1681, after which it remained under the control of his family 
into the eighteenth century.7 Moreover, although the Haarlem Courant was far from being 
the only Dutch newspaper in the decades after 1660, it was certainly pre-eminent, reflecting 
Casteleyn’s aim of producing something that was concise and far from comprehensive – it 
usually consisted of two quarto sides of tightly packed intelligence from across Europe – but 
that was well-informed and authoritative. Casteleyn explained that he sought to ‘write for 
special news from the most important towns in Europe’, even though this involved ‘some 
trouble and expense’, and he clearly sought to develop a widespread network for the 
exchange of information across Europe, not least involving powerful individuals.8 In 1677, 
for example, Casteleyn was supplying news to men like Giovanni Salvetti, resident of the 
Duke of Tuscany in London, as well as to his colleague Carlo Antonio Gondi, in order that he 
might receive news from them in return.9 His value to such men lay in the quality of the news 
that he could supply, and in 1675 it was alleged that the diplomat Abraham de Wicquefort 
paid Casteleyn ten or twelve hundred gilders a year for intelligence, ‘supposing Casteleyn 
had as particular knowledge of the secretest affairs… as any whatsoever within this whole 
land’.10 
 More importantly, Casteleyn’s news was highly sought after among a much wider 
community within England. By the late 1670s those who sought to secure regular supplies of 
his newsletters included dissidents like Dr Edward Richardson, and the Haarlem Courant 
was evidently being read fairly widely across London.11 Its information was incorporated into 
private correspondence, and it was also supplied to the proprietors of London’s coffeehouses. 
A report from August 1677, therefore, provided a list of customers who sought regular 
supplies of the ‘Harlemer’, including Mr Knight, Mr Booker, Mr Bruen, Mr Gurney, Mr 
Yorcke, Mr Roberts, Mr Garroway, Mr Chillenden, Mr Scott, Mr Wallington, Mr Mason and 
Mr Cotton, each of whom sought between one and eight copies of every issue that 
appeared.12 At least some of these men – such as Henry Wallington and Edmund Chillenden 
– are known to have been ‘coffeemen’, and indeed to have been on the regime’s radar, and 
the government was concerned not just about the association between coffeehouses and news, 
but also about the particular way in which such establishments became associated with Dutch 
gazettes and pamphlets. In 1673, for example, the earl of Arlington’s attention was drawn to 
Mrs Whitt’s coffeehouse, at the sign of the Dove in Threadneedle Street, as well as to the 
shop – appropriately called the Amsterdam Coffeehouse – which was run by Mr Kid in 
Bartholemew Lane, ‘who every post has the prints of Amsterdam’.13 
 What made such activity particularly troubling was that it involved dissidents who 
sought to circumvent the government monopoly on news. Edmund Chillenden, for example, 
who was accused of publishing ‘false news’, was a former associate of the Leveller, John 
Lilburne, and an army agitator who had participated in the Putney debates in 1647.14 As such, 
there seems to have been a fairly clear link between reading Dutch gazettes like the Haarlem 
Courant and attempts to disperse Whig news, both at home and abroad.15 Thus, in his account 
of the newsletter writers who were active in London in October 1683, William Cotton not 
only noted that some such individuals worked within the Post Office (Mr Sauteil and Mr 
Leeson), or were involved in the coffee trade (Mr Coombes and Mr Monckreive), but also 
that newsmongers like Robinson, Pike and Bill wrote for, and sent letters to, an ‘abundance 
of coffeehouses’, both within London and beyond. He also noted that, in addition to 
preparing accounts of parliamentary and court news, such men reported on European affairs, 
and even that one Mr Blackhall served coffeehouses and private customers ‘with the Haarlem 
Courant translated’.16 Indeed, by the early 1680s, Whig newspapers – of the kind that began 
to emerge after the lapse of the Licensing Act in 1679 – were also using Casteleyn’s paper as 
one of their main sources. In May 1682, for example, the controversial Whig publisher, 
Richard Janeway, confessed that the editors of the Impartial Protestant Mercury – Thomas 
Vile and Henry Care – ‘procured commonly the Latin Cologne news, the Haarlem Courant 
and the Brussels gazette’.17  
What also became clear, however, was that English newsmen sought not just to 
capitalise on the Haarlem Courant, but also to develop a working relationship with 
Casteleyn. In December 1683, therefore, one anonymous Londoner who sought to set up a 
newsletter service, and who already had regular access to the Haarlem Courant, as well as to 
other gazettes from Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris, explained that he would ‘gladly 
correspond with Casteleyn’, and that he would willingly ‘leave off’ these other suppliers ‘if 
Casteleyn be punctual with me’. The aim was to develop an exchange of news, and to ‘give 
him every post what occurs here for what is foreign’, and this particular newsmonger added 
that ‘if he approves the proposal we will try for a month or more’. That this was a Whig 
venture, moreover, seems clear from the fact that mention was made of getting Dutch 
material from notorious booksellers in the United Provinces like Mrs Swart and the widow 
Browning, as well as from the fact that the intention was to conduct correspondence with 
Casteleyn surreptitiously – using a cover address of Mr Stephen Jackson at the Grafton’s 
Head in Whitefriars – ‘for I am abused at the post house’.18 Indeed, it is possible that the 
news writer in question was Giles Hancock, the most significant intelligencer identified by 
Cotton, who had ‘great intelligence both from court and council’, who tended to get the best 
intelligence earliest, and who had ‘a great many customers’, each of whom paid £5 or £6 per 
year. Hancock, after all, already seems to have been involved in supplying Casteleyn with 
news from England.19 
 Finally, English fascination with Dutch news of the kind that Casteleyn supplied, as 
well as the association between Dutch news and English Whigs, resulted in attempts to print 
English translations of the Haarlem Courant and other Dutch gazettes. This process began in 
December 1679, with The Haerlem Courant (11 issues), and continued in early 1682 with 
The Compleat Mercury or the Haerlem Courant, published by Henry Rhodes (4 issues).20 It 
also involved another short-lived venture, an English edition of The Rotterdam’s Courant, 
which was the work of Benjamin Harris, one of the most prominent Whig newsmen to 
emerge after the lapse of licensing in 1679, and more famous as the editor of the Domestick 
Intelligence.21 Such works highlight the popularity of Dutch news, and the editor of a later 
edition of The Harlem’s Courant (1695) made clear that such a venture – to translate the 
Dutch news ‘constantly, as fast as the post comes’ – was ‘very acceptable’ because this 
particular gazette was ‘so much approved by all inquisitive persons’.22 But they also make it 
clear that the importation, exploitation and translation of Dutch news was more or less 
intimately associated with a Whig political agenda, and with attempts both to subvert the 
government’s monopoly on news and to capitalise on the lapse of licensing. 
Such evidence reveals that Dutch news, and Casteleyn’s Haarlem Courant, lay at the 
heart of official concerns regarding Restoration news culture, most particularly in the years 
surrounding the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-82. Thus, while it is well known that Charles II’s 
government became increasingly worried about the rise of coffeehouses, the development of 
newsletter services and the emergence of unlicensed newspapers, and about the extent to 
which ‘the itch of news’ had become ‘a disease’, much less attention has been paid to the fact 
that Casteleyn’s news was central to such phenomena, and thus to the problem of news 
management.23  
 
II 
 
A second way of thinking about the contemporary significance of Casteleyn’s Dutch news 
involves demonstrating the degree to which it attracted the attention of the English 
government, the ways in which its content was monitored and the reasons why this gave 
cause for concern. 
First, Casteleyn’s newspaper was read enthusiastically by English diplomats in the 
Low Countries. During the 1660s and 1670s, therefore, stories from ‘the Harlomer’ were 
frequently cited by Sir George Downing and Roger Meredith, the latter of whom often 
referred to being able to relay little more than what had appeared in local gazettes, and to 
being particularly reliant upon Casteleyn’s material.24 This is not to say that Casteleyn was 
their only source; Downing occasionally read the Amsterdam gazette, while Sir William 
Temple purchased and read gazettes from Brussels, Paris and Nuremberg, spending over £2 
on such material in a three-month period in 1667.25 Similarly, William Carr read gazettes 
‘from all parts’, and claimed to have spent no less than £100 on such material between 1672 
and 1680.26 Neither is it to say that the Haarlem Courant was necessarily thought to be 
reliable, although men like Blathwaite could certainly be observed explaining that the 
‘ordinary Dutch gazettes give you so good an account’ of many stories ‘that there remains 
nothing for me to add to it’. However, it is certainly to say that Casteleyn’s paper was taken 
seriously, and treated as something with which it was necessary to engage.27 
 As such, secondly, it is noticeable that the attention of prominent figures in London, 
like Williamson, was also drawn to the Haarlem Courant by a range of correspondents, who 
sought to ensure that copies reached government officials. This was true, for example, of 
consuls and ambassadors in the Dutch republic, including William Davidson, Sir Richard 
Bulstrode, Henry Sydney and William Blathwaite, who frequently mentioned that they sent 
regular supplies of Dutch gazettes to London.28 But copies were also sent by men like Silas 
Taylor, keeper of the naval stores at Harwich, whose regular letters to Williamson during the 
1670s detailed the searches he made of packet boats and described the kinds of people who 
were travelling between England and the Low Countries, and who frequently intercepted 
copies of Dutch gazettes, most often the Haarlem Courant. Indeed, Taylor often noted the 
stories that such papers contained, and compared their accounts with stories from other 
sources, including the London Gazette, before forwarding his copies to Whitehall.29 
Moreover, that such supplies were regular, rather than haphazard, seems perfectly clear. 
Blathwaite certainly assumed that Williamson had a steady supply of gazettes, noting in 
January 1670 that ‘I have always sent you the printed papers which come out here, except the 
gazettes which you told me you had from other parts’.30 Indeed, so reliable was Williamson’s 
supply-line that, at least for the years 1665-79, he was able to acquire two complete runs of 
Casteleyn’s paper, as well as substantial quantities of other Dutch titles.31 
 Thirdly, the government showed real signs of being worried about Casteleyn’s 
newspaper (and others), not just in terms of the way in which it reported on European affairs, 
but also in terms of the stories that it printed about English political events.32 This can 
sometimes be seen from the existence within official archives of extracted passages from 
specific issues. In July 1667, for example, notes were made on issues 58 and 59 of the 
Rotterdam gazette, including a report from London that affairs were growing ‘worse and 
worse, so that… all will be in confusion’; that ‘they begin here to cry out for a 
commonwealth government’; and that ‘England was happier under Cromwell’.33 At other 
times, complaints about European newspapers were expressed to the Dutch ambassadors in 
England. In April 1671, for example, Johannes Boreel referred to a complaint made to him 
about a story from Rome which had appeared in Amsterdam’s French gazette, and which 
claimed that an ambassador was expected from England, ‘to acknowledge the supremacy of 
the papal chair’. On this occasion, Boreel – who advocated punishing ‘this freedom of 
writing’, and who seemed amazed that ‘gazeteers should be permitted to insert such 
extravagencies and illations’ – noted that Casteleyn had written about the story ‘with more 
prudence’, and ‘without entering into particulars’.34 On other occasions, however, Boreel 
reflected that Casteleyn too was guilty of writing things ‘very ungrateful to princes’ ears’, 
and there is certainly evidence that Casteleyn was also criticised by English politicians and 
diplomats.35 
In terms of the Haarlem Courant, therefore, Downing complained in November 1663 
that Casteleyn’s paper ‘always prints all vile news against His Majesty’, and in the following 
month he cited a ‘sorry, gross and filthy mistake’ in a story regarding the Duke of York, 
adding that even a printed correction (solicited by a complaint to De Witt) proved 
unacceptable, because ‘this gazetier still puts in one thing or another to the disreputation of 
His Majesty and his affairs’. Downing noted, therefore, that ‘in this very last Tuesday’s book 
wherein he made his recantation he put that the phanaticks had another design on foot in the 
north’.36 Likewise, in November 1664, Downing explained that ‘the Haarlem gazeteer very 
often takes the liberty of decrying very infamously His Majesty and his affairs; the last week 
he printed that whereas Cromwell could in a week have gotten 1,200 seamen in the town of 
Yarmouth that His Majesty could not in much more time get above 200’.37 
 The problem raised by such stories was not just that Casteleyn’s own views might be 
problematic, but also that he was too obviously able to gain access to material that unsettled 
the English government. Sometimes this was thought to involve leaks from within the 
English government, and Downing repeatedly complained that newsletters he received from 
men like Williamson appeared ‘word for word’ in Casteleyn’s gazette.38 Another troubling 
scenario, however, involved Casteleyn forging contacts with, and coming under the influence 
of, English Whigs. In December 1683, for example, Sir Roger L’Estrange expressed concern 
about the popularity of the ‘last paper’ (i.e. scaffold speech) by the republican martyr, 
Algernon Sidney, noting not just that ‘abundance of manuscript copies of it are up and down 
the town’, but also that the text was reported to have appeared ‘at length’ in the Haarlem 
Courant.39 Indeed, in early 1678, the government claimed to have identified an extract from 
Casteleyn’s paper – reporting a ‘private order’ of the Privy Council to raise an army under the 
Duke of York – that was sent to him by Charles Vassaire and Giles Hancock, notorious 
Whigs who had contravened official orders for the suppression of coffeehouses and the 
suppression of illicit news mongering.40 
 Thus, while it is no longer possible to support the idea that European gazettes were 
treated with ‘contempt’ by contemporary politicians, it is certainly true that, in a situation 
where the government sought to control the press, enforce a news monopoly and prevent the 
circulation of Whig news, Casteleyn’s newspaper represented a genuine threat.41 What made 
the popularity of the Haarlem Courant particularly troubling, indeed, was the possibility not 
just that it would provide an alternative source of news, but also that it might become a potent 
means by which English Whigs could communicate with domestic as well as European 
audiences. 
     
III  
 
The popularity and potency of gazettes like the Haarlem Courant thus posed real problems 
for the English government, but what is interesting is that the response involved attempts to 
manage Casteleyn’s news in subtle and creative ways. Such methods deserve to be 
scrutinised much more closely, and they reveal the sophisticated political practices of 
contemporary politicians like Williamson, even if they also reveal the challenges involved in 
successful news management.42 
One way of managing Casteleyn involved complaining about his coverage, sometimes 
fairly directly. In the spring of 1681, therefore, consul William Carr explained that ‘I have 
been with Abraham Casteleyn who prints the Haarlem Courant, to let him know that if he 
continues printing such lies as he hath lately done of His Majesty’s affairs in England, that 
the States General will silence him if not get him punished’. This had been prompted by a 
report the previous week, that ‘the lord chancellor of England had advised the king to make a 
war somewhere, and that would unite the nation’. In part, of course, Carr worried about the 
impact of such stories within the Dutch republic, and he noted that this particular report 
‘afrighted these people, believing it might be with them’. However, he was probably also 
concerned about how such news might be received in England. As such, he elicited from 
Casteleyn a promise ‘never to comit such a fault more’.43 This seems to have had some effect, 
and in August 1682 Thomas Chudleigh reassured Secretary Jenkins that he had not ‘met with 
anything worthy of complaint’ in recent issues of the Haarlem Courant, whose editor ‘had 
changed his note and was become one of the kindest relators of our affairs by means of a 
sharp rebuke that he received some time ago’.44 
 Generally, however, attempts to ‘manage’ Casteleyn and Dutch news involved more 
subtle methods. There is some evidence, for example, that the government sought to control 
the availability of continental newspapers, and to recognise demand for such material while 
also regulating its flow. Writing from Dublin in August 1667, Sir Nicholas Armorer assumed 
that Williamson would be able to supply him with German gazettes, while in 1668 Robert 
Manley asked one of Williamson’s officials, Robert Francis, to send him copies of an 
unspecified Dutch gazette.45 More obviously, this management of Dutch news involved more 
proactive attempts to secure and massage the Dutch news that reached English readers. In 
part, this involved attempting to secure supplies of news from Dutch sources. In 1670, 
therefore, Temple referred to having retained the services of an unnamed Dutch intelligencer 
– ‘a knowing but a discrete man’ – while his colleague, William Blathwaite, referred to the 
‘fruits of our new intelligencer’, which he promised to send ‘once a week’.46 Temple claimed 
that this ‘paper of intelligence which I transmit weekly is so exact that I can add little to it in 
my letters’, although it seems evident that such intelligence came at a price, and diplomats in 
the Low Countries certainly acknowledged that this informer would need to be paid a 
substantial allowance.47  
More intriguing, however, is evidence that Casteleyn too became an important 
supplier of intelligence for the English government. Indeed, within the extensive government 
archive of newsletters from the Low Countries, Casteleyn’s letters are amongst the most 
numerous. For example, in a volume covering 1667-8 – a crucial year following the decisive 
Dutch raid on the Medway which brought an ignominious end to the second Anglo-Dutch 
war – there are no fewer than 119 (unsigned) letters to Williamson in Casteleyn’s distinctive 
hand, many of which have annotations naming him as the author.48 That Williamson took 
these letters very seriously is clear not just from the fact that they sometimes informed policy 
discussions, but also from the care taken to translate them, and on thirty-five of the letters 
from 1667-8 key passages have been added by Williamson’s clerks in English.49 What also 
emerges, moreover, is that Casteleyn’s often weekly letters, which were sometimes very brief 
– anywhere between a few lines and a single side of elegent and not very compressed 
handwriting – and which were very different from the richly descriptive commercial 
newsletters that were produced by Englishmen like Henry Muddiman, nevertheless contained 
extremely high-grade intelligence and comment. Casteleyn was able to offer Williamson 
material relating to debates and resolutions within the States General, diplomatic discussions, 
and disputes between different provinces, based on ‘talk’ within the elite political circles to 
which Casteleyn had access.50 In other words, Williamson not only became one of those 
people to whom Casteleyn was prepared to send news, but also one of those sources from 
which English government newsletters were constructed, and this explains the similarity 
between Williamson’s official letters and the text of the Haarlem Courant. This relationship, 
in other words, involved an exchange of material, with Williamson seeking not just to receive 
useful intelligence but also the ability to influence the content of a Dutch gazette that was 
clearly integral to news management strategies in England. 
 Understanding precisely how the English government sought to exploit Casteleyn’s 
intelligence involves recognising the mechanisms involved in the production of official news, 
and the important role that European news played within it. What is fairly well-known, 
therefore, is that after 1660 the government’s news strategy revolved around both newspapers 
like the London Gazette and scribal newsletters, and that in addition to being available for 
sale (including by subscription), such texts were also sent to individuals across the country in 
return for information. It is also recognised that tensions existed between those responsible 
for producing government news, not least between the newsletter writer Henry Muddiman 
and Williamson. Thus, while Williamson was able to control the Gazette, he was only able to 
produce inferior scribal newsletters, which struggled to compete with the letters that 
Muddiman supplied – with the backing of secretaries of state like Sir William Morice and 
their assistants like John Cook – for a fee of £5 per year.51 What is less well understood, 
however, is the role of European news within this system, and there are grounds for 
challenging the conventional argument that the superiority and popularity of scribal 
newsletters involved their ability to report on Parliament, the Privy Council and the court, 
while the London Gazette was hamstrung by merely reporting European news. This is not to 
deny that concerns were expressed that the popularity of Muddiman’s newsletters reflected 
his ability to report on domestic affairs, or that some contemporaries advocated making the 
Gazette the only form of official news.52 However, it would be a mistake to overlook the 
importance of European news within Muddiman’s newsletters, or to dismiss the Gazette 
because of its European coverage. 
 What seems clear, therefore, is that European news was central to both Muddiman’s 
newsletters and Williamson’s Gazette. Muddiman’s newsletters frequently reported on affairs 
in the United Provinces, and regularly referred to what had been gleaned from ‘Dutch letters’ 
and Dutch newspapers, as well as from the French Gazette and the Haarlem Courant,53 and it 
is likely that some of this material came via official channels, not least from the men, like 
Cook, to whom ambassadors like Temple forwarded intelligence.54 With Williamson, 
meanwhile, it is possible to document the process of managing both domestic and European 
news in some detail. Contemporaries certainly recognised that he ran the Gazette, even if it 
was written by Charles Perrot, which is why both men were sent news items and solicited 
about the inclusion of adverts, and why Williamson sometimes received complaints about its 
coverage, although it also seems clear that Secretary Arlington had the power to decide which 
stories to include and which to leave out.55 More importantly, it also seems clear not just that 
Williamson’s team read, annotated and made extracts from ambassadorial letters, but also 
that men like Sir Philip Frowde, Robert Francis, James Hickes and Robin Yard managed the 
postal system so as to facilitate the ‘extracting, copying, translating… of all matters of 
correspondence’, and the presentation of evidence to Williamson and Arlington so that it 
could be ‘communicated to ministers abroad as well as to country friends at home’.56 Indeed, 
it seems perfectly clear that these extracts – from both letters and printed gazettes – were 
explicitly intended to ‘frame… what is fit for the Gazette’.57 As such, it is possible to note the 
frequency with which Williamson’s newspaper drew upon evidence from Dutch letters, and 
the similarities between passages in the Gazette and in European newspapers, and to 
reconstruct the paper trail of such operations fairly precisely. This involves copies of Dutch 
letters that Robert Yard made for the London Gazette, extracts from letters that were 
endorsed ‘gazette’, and orders from the Privy Council about stories which were to be 
included, as well as the reports which Williamson’s correspondents explicitly hoped to see in 
print.58 
 Moreover, such official management of both the newsletters and the Gazette also 
involved Casteleyn. On the basis of a close reading of the Haarlem Courant, therefore, 
Williamson was fairly confident that Muddiman must have been supplying him with 
information in the mid-1660s, presumably in return for at least some of the ‘Dutch letters’ 
than informed his newsletters.59 At the same time, Williamson also took great care to make 
detailed notes on Dutch affairs in his personal notebooks.60 Indeed, both Muddiman and 
Williamson recorded precisely the kind of information and analysis that Casteleyn’s letters 
provided, in terms of the mood of the Dutch people, divisions between different Dutch 
provinces over political and diplomatic strategies and the Prince of Orange, and the attitudes 
and tactics of men like Johann De Witt, not least during the Treaty of Breda which formally 
ended the second Anglo-Dutch war in 1667.61 It is striking, therefore, that Muddiman’s 
newsletters and Williamson’s notebooks often contained precisely the same reports, in 
exactly the same words. Both men cited the letter which referred to the fact that ‘De Witt 
talks big, tells the people all our offers are but arts and tricks and so prepares vigorously for 
the war’, and both men added that De Witt had ‘lost a great point in the business of the treaty, 
the provinces having declared they will each send one or two apiece as their plenipotentiaries 
to Breda, which shall not be of the States General, most of whom its supposed Dr Witt had 
already gained to be his’. Both men also noted that ‘Zeeland and Gelderland continue 
extremely zealous for the peace and Zeeland desires much that our ambassadors may in their 
way to Breda pass by Middleburg’.62 Similarly, both Muddiman and Williamson picked up 
on the story that De Witt had turned ‘Spaniard’, in order to quash the idea that he was too 
close to the French.63 Finally, both men noted the letter from May 1667 which claimed that 
De Witt had ‘prevailed’ over his rivals by suggesting that the English and French would 
‘force’ the Dutch to ‘a disadvantageous peace at Breda’; that he had been ‘tampering’ with 
the Prince of Orange’s friends, to ensure that he would ‘disown forever all his pretensions or 
claims to the office of stadtholder’; and that ‘this trick will not take’.64 Given that the two 
men very clearly did not collaborate, such similarities either suggest that Williamson was 
taking notes from Muddiman’s newsletters, or that both men were drawing their intelligence 
from the same pool of Dutch newsletters.65 
 Such evidence indicates that Casteleyn’s correspondence would repay very close 
scrutiny, but in the meantime it can be shown with certainty that material from his letters to  
Williamson was incorporated into the London Gazette. In 1668, therefore, Williamson’s clerk 
translated and highlighted a passage from Casteleyn’s letter of 31 July (new style), regarding 
an episode in which French forces had been overpowered by the inhabitants of Madagascar, 
leaving the survivors to limp back to the Cape of Good Hope.66 Subsequently, the same story 
appeared almost word for word in the Gazette on 27 July (old style).67 Similarly, the Gazette 
subsequently published another story – relating to a decision by the States General to enhance 
De Witt’s salary and provide him with a ‘present’ of 60,000 gilders – which had appeared 
with almost the same phrasing in another of Casteleyn’s letters.68 
  Thus, while it is likely that Muddiman and Williamson both drew upon a range of 
sources for news from the United Provinces, it also seems perfectly clear that both men 
valued Casteleyn’s newsletters and gazettes particularly highly, and were willing to 
incorporate their evidence into their own news texts. At the same time, however, such 
attempts to exploit Dutch intelligence, and Casteleyn’s material in particular, were also 
somewhat problematic. What seems evident, therefore, is that English diplomats became 
worried about how Dutch intelligence was being used in London. In 1670, for example, 
Temple advised that the ‘particular advices’ that were supplied by his intelligencer should be 
carefully controlled, ‘least the publishing of them there may occasion an inquiry here into 
their source’. Blathwaite likewise emphasised the need for ‘secrecy’ relating to ‘the papers of 
intelligence you receive from hence’, citing ‘great difficulties of late in persuading the person 
from whom it comes to continue it, since the severity used by the States in the sentences of 
others in the like occasion’.69 Indeed, when Temple urged Williamson not to let the 
intelligencer’s letters ‘fall into the hands of the ordinary intelligencer’ in June 1670, and ‘to 
use his own discretion in drawing what he will out of them for furnishing his gazette’, he 
highlighted a specific story ‘in the last but one’, where the editor had ‘set down the particular 
business and instruction of Mons van der Tockt upon his return to Brussels’.70 This referred 
to a story regarding a Dutch envoy to the Spanish Netherlands, who had ‘given the States an 
account of the many difficulties in his negotiation at Brussels’, which reported how he was 
ordered to return and ‘declare the resolution of the States, to put into execution the marine 
treaty made with Spain in the year 1650’.71 According to Temple, indeed, ‘some such 
particulars before in your gazette had very near broke off my intelligence, and I should be 
very sorry to lose it, because he gives me what passes in the States of Holland as well as 
General, which is not usual, and besides it would be very hard getting another at this time, 
upon the late rout among the clerks’.72 
 This problem of how best to manage and utilise Dutch intelligence can also be shown 
to have applied to Casteleyn himself. In July 1671, Blathwaite apologised for not sending ‘the 
ordinary paper of intelligence’ by noting that ‘several things have been lately printed in the 
English diurnall… which have so highly offended the States General in whose assembly that 
Gazette was read’.73 On this occasion he cited the issue of the Gazette that had appeared on 
22 May, where the offending item discussed support for the Prince of Orange within 
Gelderland, as well as the hostility that this had elicited from the deputies of Holland, who 
threatened to register an official protest.74 What makes this story particularly intriguing, 
however, is that it was said to have come from a Haarlem letter dated 26 May, and that it 
relayed precisely the same story as Casteleyn’s letter to Williamson of the same date.75 The 
upshot on this occasion was that ‘that the person that furnishes us with the intelligence has 
declared that he dares not venture any further, especially now his quarter is at an end’, and 
although Blathwaite was sanguine that the intelligencer could be ‘induced to continue his 
intelligence’, he also noted that this would be dependent on ‘an assurance of a better 
management for the future of his advices’.76 
 
IV 
 
In assessing the attitude of English officials to the work of men like Abraham Casteleyn, this 
article makes no claims to being definitive. This has not been the place to discuss English 
concerns about, and attempts to exploit, the impact of the Haarlem Courant within the United 
Provinces and across mainland Europe, even though contemporaries were acutely conscious 
of, and nervous about, its reach and influence.77 Similarly, while it has highlighted the 
contemporary importance of Dutch newsletters and newspapers to English officials, there 
would certainly be scope to compare Casteleyn’s letters with the texts of English newsletters 
and newspapers in a much more thorough fashion, even if only to gain a greater sense of the 
intensity with which his intelligence was incorporated into official news from Whitehall. 
Nevertheless, enough has hopefully been done to demonstrate the range of ways in which it is 
possible to develop much further recent attempts to improve our understanding about 
contemporary interest in European news, and to move beyond simplistic and outdated 
arguments about how the prevalence of European news attests to the poverty of Restoration 
news culture, and of the London Gazette in particular.78 Indeed, what has become clear is not 
just the importance that was attached to Dutch news by contemporary readers, but also the 
central role that such news played in English political affairs after 1660. What contemporary 
politicians faced was a situation in which the availability of Dutch intelligence was hugely 
important to those who sought to break the government’s news monopoly, and in which  
Anglo-Dutch affairs were integral to political divisions between Whigs and Tories. 
Moreover, this exploration of contemporary responses to Dutch news in general, and to 
Casteleyn in particular, makes it clear that the importance of Casteleyn’s newspaper, his 
potential influence over a range of audiences, and the prevalence of his news within the 
English public sphere helped to provide the impetus for news management of unprecedented 
sophistication. English officials recognised, in other words, that newspapers like the Haarlem 
Courant could play a vital role in influencing public opinion; that there was a serious risk that 
they might be exploited by English Whigs in order to engage with audiences both at home 
and on the Continent; and that English newsletters and newspapers could be used to 
undermine support for, and enflame people against, the Dutch as well as the Whigs.79 As 
such, officials in Whitehall and the Hague understood very clearly that Casteleyn was 
someone who needed to be managed, in ways which not only involved threats and 
intimidation, but also collaboration and co-option, as news was exchanged through back 
channels and private correspondence, and then fed into discussions, newsletters and 
newspapers. At a time when the management of news and opinion was taken very seriously, 
when Anglo-Dutch relations were more or less tense, and when English Whigs at home and 
abroad were engaged in plotting and in mobilising support from sympathisers in the Low 
Countries, Casteleyn’s newsletters and gazettes were not only highly valued but also 
exploited, by news-hungry readers, by Whig journalists and by government officials. 
Ultimately, this meant that Casteleyn’s scribal and printed texts became more or less integral 
to the English government’s strategies for grappling with news culture, even if scrutiny of the 
ways in which Dutch intelligence was integrated into English newsletters and newspapers 
also brings into focus some of the pitfalls of late seventeenth century news management. 
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